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EVIDENCE
United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d 1463
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Bernard, was convicted of conspiracy and bank fraud.
He was also convicted of making false entries as a bank officer. Bernard
appealed, asserting that the district court erred in permitting his attorney to testify, and in determining that he had waived his attorney-client
privilege.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bernard sacrificed his attorney-dient privilege by voluntarily disclosing confidential communications to a nonparty in an effort to induce the nonparty into action. The
court stated that the attorney-dient privilege need not be allowed when
the party claiming it is attempting to utilize it in a manner that is inconsistent with the privilege.
Moreover, under Fed. R. Evid. 103, an error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right is affected. The court concluded that no substantial right was affected by the attorney's testimony, and the assertion of error was without merit.
Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Boren, brought this action against his plant manager, defendant, Sable. Boren appealed ajury verdict in favor of Sable, contending that the district court erred in finding statements made by Boren's
co-workers inadmissible hearsay.
Affirming the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that the
co-workers' statements did not qualify as admissions of a party-opponent under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (d). Application of Rule 801(d) (2) (d)
requires a three-part showing. First, the existence of the employment
relationship must be established independent of the declarant's statement. Second, the statement must be made during the existence of the
declarant's agency or employment. Third, the statement must concern a
matter within the scope of declarant's employment. Where a party-opponent controls the operations of the corporate employer and controls
the daily tasks of the declarant, an agency relationship is established for
purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(d). Boren failed to establish that such control existed.
United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Eufracio-Torres ("Torres"), appealed his convictions
for transporting illegal aliens, claiming the district court erred in admit-
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ting into evidence deposition testimony of material witnesses and
Torres's prior convictions for illegal entry into the United States.
The Tenth Circuit found that the witnesses' fifth amendment rights
against being detained when charged with no crimes outweighed
Torres's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Finding the government's efforts to produce the witnesses "reasonable" and in "good
faith," the court affirmed that the witnesses were "unavailable" for trial
under Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). Thus, the district court properly admitted
the deposition testimony.
The court further held that the introduction of evidence regarding
Torres's prior convictions was proper for the limited purpose of showing his knowledge of the aliens' illegal presence pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b). The court noted that the limiting instructions to the jury
prevented undue prejudice.
Head v. Lithonia Corporation, 881 F.2d 941
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Lithonia Corporation ("Lithonia"), appealed from a
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Head. Lithonia claimed
that the district court abused its discretion in permitting Head's expert
to testify in an area outside his expertise, and in admitting evidence
based on data that is not reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
The Tenth Circuit found that the record did not sufficiently establish the trustworthiness of certain medical testing (topographical brain
mapping), or its acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Thus,
the court held, the district court abused its discretion in failing to address Lithonia's objection to the introduction of testimony based on
topographical brain mapping without a proper foundation. The court
vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Marsee, brought a products liability action against defendant, United States Tobacco Company ("Tobacco"), a manufacturer of
snuff tobacco products. Marsee initiated the action on behalf of decedent who died of oral cancer. The district court held for Tobacco and
Marsee appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the verdict. It ruled that: (1) a videotaped deposition of a severely disfigured cancer patient was overly prejudicial and inadmissible in the absence of evidence that the witness' oral
cancer was in fact caused by the use of snuff, (2) the district court's hearsay exclusion of certain cases not alluded to in the doctor's direct testimony, but used as a basis for his opinions, was not sufficiently erroneous
to set aside the jury verdict in favor of the defendant; (3) rebuttal testimony of the decedent's physicians, as well as scientific charts, were
properly excluded as needlessly cumulative; (4) reports published by
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non-governmental health agencies were properly excluded as repetitive;
and (5) articles introduced by Tobacco to show that decedent had notice
of the dangers of tobacco products were properly admitted into
evidence.
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 888 F.2d 646
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, New England Mutual Life Insurance Company ("New England"), sought a declaratory judgment that defendant, Anderson, had
fraudulently procured an insurance policy. New England attempted to
enter into evidence a newspaper article in which Anderson had made
certain admissions. The district court refused entry of the article, holding that it represented inadmissible hearsay. New England appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the article was hearsay because the ad-

missions were actually statements of a third-party reporter who was unavailable for cross-examination and the statements were offered to
prove the truth of the matters asserted. The court further held that

newspaper articles do not inherently satisfy any of the exceptions or exclusions to the hearsay rule. The article does not rise to the level of an
adoptive admission under Fed. R. Evid. § 801(d)(2) merely because Anderson failed to dispute, contradict, or protest its contents. Newspaper
articles are also not self-authenticating under Fed. R. Evid. § 902(6).
Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250
Author: Judge Seymour
During Plaintiff, Nichols' criminal trial, two of the State's witnesses
referred to Nichols' prior incarceration despite the judge's orders to
avoid such testimony. In district court, Nichols alleged that references to
prior convictions violated his right to due process, fair trial, and his due
process right to an impartial judge. The district court dismissed with
prejudice Nichols' petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Nichols appealed. The State argued, however, that Nichols' habeas corpus petition
should not be heard because Nichols had not presented his due process
challenge in state court and, thus, had not exhausted state remedies.
The Tenth Circuit found that Nichols had cited the fifth amendment
due process clause as a basis for his claim to the state court. Consequently, Nichols exhausted his state remedies. The court also held that
Nichols' due process rights were not denied because references to Nichols' past convictions were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. Further due process was afforded Nichols when the judge offered
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury. Also, the court stated that
evidence of prior convictions could have been admitted for purposes of
impeachment when Nichols took the stand. Nichols, therefore, did not
suffer prejudice of a constitutional dimension. The court also held that
Nichols was not denied due process simply because the sentencing
judge had knowledge of Nichols' past convictions. The court stated
there was no evidence of "actual bias" or "likelihood of bias or appear-
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ance of bias" on the part of the sentencing judge. The order of the district court dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.
United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878

Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Porter, appealed his conviction of bank burglary, claiming that the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain bad
acts evidence and by refusing to admit certain hearsay testimony. Porter
also alleged that the district court improperly gave an Allen instruction
and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's admission of bad
acts evidence without specifically articulating the grounds was not an
abuse of discretion because its purpose was apparent from the record.
The district court's exclusion of a hearsay statement was permissible because the statement failed to satisfy the trustworthiness rationale of Fed.
R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The court found that the Allen instruction was not
unduly coercive, but was a proper exercise of the judge's duty to guide
the jury. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support the jury's verdict. The judgment was affirmed.

